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universe at large is a distressingly intimate affair; it becomes a gigantic frame about his finite destiny. His cosmos is the place in which he must get to feel at home and find a task. A man's efforts at such orientation and allignment constitute his philosophy, and success in these efforts would not be a bad name for edification.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introduction to Social Psychology. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1917. Pp. 343.

It is less than a decade ago that Professor Ross published his *Social Psychology,* the pioneer in this new field of the social sciences. Yet already a number of suggestive works on this subject have appeared, among which the thoughtful study of McDougall is perhaps best known. Latest in time is Professor Ellwood's interesting book which he characterizes as in general "a simplification and systematization of the theories presented" in the author's *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects,* published in 1912. At the outset the general point of view of the book is stated as follows: "The explanation of social phenomena is to be sought in the underlying traits and dispositions of the individual, in the influences of the environment which act upon his plastic nature, and in the resultant aims and standards which he develops." Obvious as this fact may appear to some readers, it is well to remember that the position of psychology as the foundation of all the social sciences has, as yet, received little more than theoretical recognition. Practically psychology is ignored by a majority of the writers on social and economic questions; or, at best it receives slight consideration and that of a popular sort.

The psychological position of Professor Ellwood is in hearty accord with the functional psychology of the present day. This means, of course, that he starts with the behavior of individuals and regards instinct, feeling, and intelligence as instruments in the control of behavior to the end of successful adaptation. Such a view of human nature does not readily lend itself to the theory that the individual is a passive and inert victim of environmental conditions. On the contrary, the author seeks to refute that "easy-going philosophy" with the biologic fact that all organisms are self-active and katabolic. Hence the external stimulus does not compel action, but rather conditions and gives opportunity for it. This view receives interesting application in the author's criticism of economic determinism as a theory of social progress. Obviously, such a doctrine reduces the psychological factors to more reflexes. It leaves out of account, as Professor Ellwood makes plain, the organizing and creative tendencies of social life in its higher phases. "Ideas are determined by the environment, according to this theory, and not, as we have seen, by both original human nature and the environment." Moreover, it is the interrelations of individuals in such primary groups as the family and the neighborhood which furnish the chief source of the standards and ideals of peoples. Now such groups are found everywhere in all stages of industrial development. Together with human nature itself they determine the controlling ideas and aims of social life vastly more than does the economic system. If the adherents of economic determinism were correct, the material civilization of a people would always develop in advance of its language, its art, its science or its moral and religious systems. Yet history shows many instances of change in the artistic, moral, or religious ideas of nations in advance of their systems of industry.

Professor Ellwood accords due recognition to instincts as the original motor tendencies of human nature and, therefore, "the primary forces of society." But he deprecates any conception of instincts as definitely fixed reactions and emphasizes their vagueness and extreme modifiability. Just as instincts are the racially persistent activities that come to individuals through heredity, so habits are the modifications of these activities due to environmental influences and to experience. Human instincts furnish the raw material of social institutions which essentially are social habits. Upon the basis of these two factors civilization is built and made continuous and stable.

Starting his interpretation of social life with a study of social activities or with the group "doing something," the author finds the source of social unity in the coordination of the activities of the group members. But if individuals are to carry on common activities through interstimulation and response, they must maintain certain psychical attitudes toward each other. Common feelings, ideas, beliefs, and valuations must develop as controls of the group activities. "Human social groups especially are characterized by the large feeling and ideational elements which enter into their life." And these subjective accompaniments of social coordinations are the supremely significant factors which must be understood if social life is to be successfully controlled. As man climbs from the perceptual world in which he began to the ideational world in which he exists to-day, he accumulates a rich store of tradition which goes far to maintain social continuity. With the progress of social evolution, however, social changes become both more rapid and more complex; and out of these changes social consciousness is born. These social mutations commonly originate in some change in the environment or in the group organization which makes old social customs unworkable or ill-adjusted. Upon these badly working social habits attention is fixed and by them thought is challenged. Only in the degree that such social self-consciousness is developed and is furthered by public discussion, can human societies " gain collective control over the conditions of their existence." For only as individuals become conscious of grave social maladjustments will they employ their higher intellectual capacities in the task of securing better adaptation to social conditions. The intellect and its ideas, then, are the instruments by which social progress can be controlled and even rationally planned in advance. Hence it is of the utmost importance that the intellectual life of a group " should be organized, and socially guided and controlled."

At this point Professor Ellwood raises the interesting question whether a high degree of rationality is consistent with the best development of the social life. Certainly the Greeks were at the same time the most intellectual people of antiquity and the least gifted with practical social genius. Professor Ellwood answers the question by declaring that " the antagonism between social and intellectual development is more apparent than real." Probably the opposition arises in large measure from the fact that the intellect is stimulated chiefly by conditions of maladjustment and change and these social changes are often disturbing, for a time at least, to harmonious and stable social relations. Then, too, it must be remembered that intellectual activity may never have been socialized, but, on the contrary, may have developed in an exceedingly narrow and relatively useless sphere. However, the author very justly claims that the " existence of unsocialized thinking no more implies an unsocial character of thought processes, than the existence of unsocialized desire."

In the chapter on " Social Change under Abnormal Conditions " Professor Ellwood takes issue with the doctrine of social evolution by mutation or revolutionary change, a doctrine that he believes to be growing in popularity. The argument for catastrophic social methods on the ground of their analogy to De Vries's theory of mutation is not sound. Social evolution does not follow organic evolution either in nature or in method. While it can not be denied that social progress has often come, in the past, from revolutionary methods, yet the social ruin and disaster that have resulted from such methods make it incumbent upon students of human history to point out another and a better road to progress. In a flexible society where ample room is provided for discussion in the interests of enlightened public opinion and where intelligent leadership is welcomed, revolutions will never be necessary.

Professor Ellwood's book is characterized throughout by a reasoned optimism and a broad and inspiring outlook. While refusing to regard man as the puppet of circumstance, the author yet grants that every aspect of consciousness is socially conditioned. He looks for a wider extension and interdependence of human activities as the sole condition under which thought may become socialized, beyond the limits of nationality, and " a humanity of wide sympathy and good will " may be developed. When reason and good will are made to work together for the advancement of the interests of all mankind then wars will cease. The extension of such rationality and good will among peoples is the great task of every social institution, but in a special sense this responsibility devolves upon education. WILLYSTINE GOODSELL.

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The Order of Nature. LAWRENCE J. HENDERSON. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1917. Pp. v + 234.

The scholarly scientist is sure to write a book full of facts interesting to the philosopher. This Professor Henderson has already done in his *Fitness of the Environment.* The scientist is not so sure to give his facts adequate philosophic interpretation. *The Fitness of the Environment* was marred by a most naïve teleology and this new book comes apparently to give teleology a deeper and more acceptable interpretation. But I can not believe that its author has been wholly successful in this.

About one third of the book is taken up with a history of teleological thinking as it appears with Aristotle and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this the author has acquitted himself well and shows a most commendable grasp of the history of philosophy. There follow studies of biology, nature, evolution, the factors on which life depends, and the problem of teleology proper. The conclusion is that "the contrast of mechanism with teleology is the very foundation of the order of nature, which must ever be regarded from two complementary points of view, as a vast assemblage of changing systems, and as an harmonious unity of changeless laws and qualities working together in the process of evolution" (p. 209).

The evidence for this conclusion seems to be: "First, the characteristics of systems (phases. components, activities, *etc.*) are universal conditions of all phenomena, except the infra-molecular. They do not depend upon the peculiarities of the numerous varieties of matter, and they are changeless.